The Semiotic Roots of the Divergence between Chinese and Western Literary Theory, and the Mechanism and Path of Their Fusion and Reconstruction

There are mainly two answers to the question of the root of the divergence between Chinese and Western literary theory, namely cultural difference and difference of thinking. These two answers are, to be sure, not wrong; but, compared with cultural and thinking difference, the most fundamental is the difference of the sign-system. Neither culture nor thinking-activity can do without symbolic signs, and their characteristics too are rooted in the structural characteristics of the sign-system; at the same time, only by deeply understanding the sign-system can we possibly go on to explore the mechanism and path of the fusion and reconstruction of Chinese and Western literary theory.

Cassirer holds that human culture is precisely symbolic-sign activity. On this basis Geertz points out the diversity of symbolic signs, including behavior, language, and all kinds of meaningful objects. We hold that, although human symbolic-sign activity is of all kinds, among them the most original and most basic are two: namely “behavior-language” (action, posture, expression, voice) and “speech-act.” All the other kinds of sign-activity are only extensions and expansions upon a medium; their fundamental nature still depends on these two acts (languages). Culture is coordinately constructed on the foundation of the interaction of behavior-language and speech-act, while literature is the deep cooperation and fusion of the two acts (languages). (1) It is precisely the structural mode of the combination of these two acts (languages) that determines the uniqueness of cultural production, thinking habits, and literary activity.

Behavior-language existed already in the pre-human period. In the process by which the organism continually repeats and imitates effective behaviors, it gradually internalizes and structures behavior and so generates group-shared meaning, thereby forming behavior-language; therefore behavior-language is, in effect, “structured behavior.” Because these structured behaviors are shaped in the process of adapting to the environment, they are necessarily closely bound up with a specific environment and become a common representation of the organism's relation to the environment. Behavior-language simultaneously relates the organism's internal world and external world; it both sediments into the organism's experience and integrally represents the relation of inner and outer worlds. (2) Speech-act, in turn, is differentiated out on the basis of behavior-language; it classifies, generalizes, and abstracts experience, condensing it into discrete concepts, thereby constructing a sign-system with relative independence, and becoming a sign-activity enjoyed by the human alone.

But these two acts (languages) have utterly different natures, modes of execution, and functions: behavior-language uses “bodily information” (kinaesthesia) to establish difference—it is, in effect, bodily performance; it directly belongs to the body and is a sign-system lacking independence; while speech-act establishes difference by its “concept/sound-image,” and is thereby distanced from the body, a sign-system with relative independence. The human relates to the world by behavior; with behavior-language he structures the world and takes it into himself, fusing world and human into one and so grasping the world, and conferring on the world a human behavioral structure and life-form, anthropomorphizing and embodying the world. But because behavior-language lacks independence and cannot separate human from world, cannot construct the human's “object-world,” it also cannot construct human consciousness, and can only constitute unconscious experience. (3) It is precisely the action of behavior-language that makes it possible to set up a non-objective relation between human and world, constructing the realm of thing-and-self-as-one, of no-thing and no-self. Experience, apprehension, intuition, empathy, and instinct are built on the foundation of the functional characteristics of behavior-language. Speech-act, in turn, by virtue of its independence and differentiality, distinguishes human from world and distinguishes the myriad things from one another, thereby—while constructing the human's object-world—reflexively constituting human consciousness. (4) From this, the undivided relation of human and world is split into the dualistic relation of subject and object opposed, and the objective relation between human and world is constructed. The mode of thinking we call subject-object-split, logical, and analytic is precisely founded on the functional characteristics of speech-act. It endows the human with the capacity of observational cognition, of logical inference, and of reflection. Speech-act both shapes the order of the object-world and, by its reflexivity, bestows reason upon the human. Behavior-language and speech-act are two utterly different modes of relating between human and world; these two different acts (languages) coexist in human activity, jointly determining the mode of human cultural creation and thinking, while the imbalance of their relation creates the uniqueness of the culture and thinking of different peoples. Therefore the difference of the culture, thinking, and of the literature and literary theory of different peoples is rooted precisely in two acts (languages) of different natures: the integral structure and inclination of the mutual combination of behavior-language and speech-act.

II. The Mode of Symbolic-Sign Activity Behind “Idea” and “Dao”

Human symbolic-sign activity simultaneously shapes the human's internal world and external world; it both stamps an imprint on human thinking and reconstructs the human's world, determining the mode of relating between human and world. This is to say, behavior-language and speech-act, with their different modes of operation and functional characteristics, coordinately construct the complex and changeable relational mode between human and world. Human cultural production depends precisely on the mode of symbolic-sign activity, depends on the mode of relating between human and world.

Different peoples' recognition of the world's origin and supreme law is closely related to the uniqueness of symbolic-sign activity, closely related to the integral structure of the mutual coordination of speech-act and behavior-language—and especially the dominant inclination of this structure—and closely related to the mode of relating between human and world established by the two acts (languages). Plato's “idea” and Laozi's “Dao” reflect this difference with extreme vividness.

In the Republic, Plato says: “In all cases where we apply the same name to many things, I take it we assume them to have only one form or idea.” (5) He gives an example: there exist three kinds of bed. The first is the natural bed, the essence of the bed, the real, that is, the idea of the bed; this is eternal and unchanging, and no one can make it. The second is the bed made by the carpenter; this is only a concrete bed, which partakes of the idea of the bed, is the shadow of the idea, and not the idea itself. The third is the bed the painter paints; this is only an imitation of the concrete bed, the shadow of a shadow, separated from the idea or the real by two layers. Although Plato's “idea” has a mysterious coloring, because the thought of “idea” is inferred according to the generalizing of many concrete things by “the same name,” it is related to the linguistic concept; or one may say, this notion about the origin of the world is established on the foundation of speech-act, inferred through the linguistic concept. It is precisely according to the fact that various different beds have a common concept “bed” that Plato infers the existence of an idea of the bed.

The idea is related to the abstract concept, and not to the individual, concrete thing; therefore it cannot be grasped by relying on human sense-perception, and even requires the exclusion of the disturbance of vision and hearing—only through intention and intellect is it possible to draw near it, only by the help of rational thinking can it be understood. “He must use the pure, absolute intellect to discover the pure, absolute essence of the thing; he must, as far as possible, separate himself from the eyes, the ears, and the whole body, because he feels that the company of the body would disturb his soul and hinder his attainment of truth and wisdom.” (6) It is precisely for this reason that Nie Minli holds: “Plato's idea, viewed from the objective aspect, is by no means the sensuous form of the thing, but the essence of the thing; it constitutes the most real existence of the thing, and this is also the ontic being of the thing. And as the most real existence and essence of the thing, it is not the cognitive object of sense-experience, but the cognitive object of rational thinking; viewed from the angle of thinking, it is the concept of thinking.” (7)

Differing from Plato's “idea,” Laozi's “Dao” is precisely neither concept nor image. “The Dao that can be spoken is not the constant Dao”—once one names it with language and snares it with concepts, it is as if the “chaos” (hundun) is bored through, and one is bound to lose the “Dao” itself, no longer that vague and indistinct, ever-moving and never-ceasing “Dao.” Laozi says: “There is a thing formed of chaos, born before heaven and earth. Silent and void! It stands alone and does not change, moves in a circle and does not tire; it may be the mother of all under heaven. I do not know its name; I style it ‘Dao,’ and forcing a name for it, I call it ‘Great.’ The Great is called the passing; the passing is called the far; the far is called the returning. The Dao is great, heaven is great, earth is great, the king too is great. Within the realm there are four greats, and the king dwells as one of them. The human takes the earth as model, the earth takes heaven as model, heaven takes the Dao as model, and the Dao takes the self-so (ziran) as model.” (8) The natural “Dao” is the root of the world, the source of heaven, earth, and the human. The human, by means of behavior-language, relates directly to the world and mutually mixes with it, and can thereby go on to grasp the world, to apprehend the world, and so to guide his own behavior; because behavior-language is a non-independent sign-system, it has not yet split nature from human, has not yet split the myriad things from one another, has not yet constructed the world into a clear object-world, and therefore the world remains undivided, chaotically undistinguished, dim and unclear—and this is precisely the state of existence of the natural “Dao” as the origin of the world. This state can only be apprehended through behavior-language, and cannot be named with linguistic concepts, cannot be interpreted with speech-act. In order to say something of it, one can only reluctantly name it with “Dao,” and describe it indirectly and roundabout with “great,” “passing,” “far,” “returning,” drawing near it—yet these too are not the “Dao” itself. Laozi well knew the predicament of the human condition: the human can only clearly explain and manifest the world with language, yet language, because of its limitation, cannot truly touch the root of the world; therefore he could only, by way of indirect hinting, expend five thousand words, attempting thereby to explore the origin and law of the world in a roundabout way.

The human relates to the world by means of behavior, structuring the world with behavior-language and taking it into himself, thereby grasping the world and apprehending the “Dao.” This way of apprehending the “Dao” is to assimilate and fuse world and human, to establish the non-objective relation of thing-and-self-as-one; the world is only the extension of the human's body, and not the “object” of the human's consciousness. Viewed from this angle of the human's conscious object, the original world is “nothing,” and the Dao too is “nothing.” In discussing primitive thinking, Lévy-Bruhl points out: “When primitive man's thinking presents the object to himself, it presents something more than this object: his thinking grasps the object, and at the same time is grasped by the object. Thinking fuses with the object; it interpenetrates with the object not only in the sense of ideology but also in the material and mysterious sense. This thinking not only imagines the object but also experiences it… Therefore, at this stage, it is not yet a matter of collective representation; rather, we may say they are a collective psychic state characterized by extremely intense emotion, in which states representation has not yet differentiated out from those movements and actions of interpenetration that help the group realize what it pursues. Their interpenetration with representation is so really experienced that it has not yet been truly imagined.” Just as with those states of spiritual reversal, “in these states, because subject and object are completely merged, the true representation is not to be seen.” (9) Primitive thinking is thinking in which behavior-language holds absolute advantage, a state of subject-object fusion; although it cannot yet form a clear representation, it has in fact already, through behavior-language, intuitively grasped the undivided world. Therefore, for Laozi, “nothing” is by no means empty and possessing nothing, but chaotically undistinguished; it is the state in which the conscious object has not yet been constructed, not the lack of the ontic, and therefore cannot be grasped by intellect, cannot be explained by language. Han Feizi explains: “Now although the Dao cannot be obtained and heard or seen, the sage holds fast to its visible effects in order to see its form, therefore it is said: the form of the formless, the image of the imageless.” (10) This is to say, the “Dao” is formless, shapeless, imageless; it not only cannot be spoken with words but also cannot be heard through the intervention of speech-act factors; it exists in a non-objective manner. What can be spoken, heard, and seen can only be the “object,” and is already no longer that “Dao” itself.

Once the human begins to force the name “Dao” with the linguistic concept, there is the formation-of-form of the “One.” The essence of speech is precisely to use differentiality to carry out distinction; it is bound once again to make a cutting of the world, and so there is the “two” of the division of heaven-and-earth, yin-and-yang, and, because heaven and earth, yin and yang, mutually stir and so generate, the human who “makes a third with heaven and earth.” With the human, there are also the myriad things as the human's object. So Laozi says: “The myriad things under heaven are born of being, and being is born of nothing.” (11) And again: “The Dao is the secret recess of the myriad things.” (12) Zhuangzi says it more clearly: “Heaven and earth are born together with me, and the myriad things are one with me. Since we are already one, can there still be speech? Since it is already called ‘one,’ can there be no speech?” (13) In the state where human and nature are fused into one, speech-act loses the possibility and necessity of its existence; but once one speaks this state with “one,” speech-act has in fact already come on stage, and there follows the division of heaven-and-earth, yin-and-yang, and the suckling of the myriad things. The “Dao” pervades the myriad things, and the myriad things take the “Dao” as their origin, yet are not equivalent to the “Dao.”

The understanding of the “Dao” requires the help of “apprehension,” that is, non-rational intuition, and this in turn requires “reaching the utmost emptiness, holding fast to stillness.” (14) Xunzi says: the myriad things differ and mutually screen one another; “the gentleman unifies himself with the Dao and thereby aids in the examination of things.” (15) Only by “emptiness, unity, and stillness” can one become one with the Dao, can one remove the screen, can one “trace the Dao to its source” and “embody the Dao,” and only then go on to clearly examine the myriad things. Once the human uses his own sense-organs of vision and hearing, human and world are bound to split into the dualistic, opposed objective relation, and the “Dao” is thereby screened or distorted; so the Zhuangzi, “Knowledge Wandered North,” says: “The Dao cannot be heard; what is heard is not it. The Dao cannot be seen; what is seen is not it. The Dao cannot be spoken; what is spoken is not it.” (16) Desire and intention are always desire and intention about an “object”; they the more distort the relation of human and world, and therefore the more cannot grasp the “Dao.” Only by relinquishing sense-organ activity and subjective intention, restraining rational thinking, and keeping the state of mind clear and still, is it possible to awaken unconscious experience, to rebuild with behavior-language the harmonious relation of human and world, to let the human again fuse into one with the world, to be transformed together with things and not take this for “mind-fasting,” and thereby to apprehend the “Dao.” This is what is called “embodying the Dao,” or as Zhuangzi says: “Sloughing off the limbs and trunk, dimming intelligence, departing from form and casting off knowledge, becoming one with the Great Thoroughfare—this is called ‘sitting in forgetfulness.’” (17) Only by breaking free of the human's various desires, sense-perception, and intellect, breaking free of the split state of human and world, breaking free of speech-act's cutting of the undivided relation—at the juncture where speech-act has not yet been born and is about to pass—just as in the state of “forgetting words” that Zhuangzi speaks of, behavior-language comes on stage with a new posture. Human and world are again thoroughly connected; the world is in an instant illuminated; the “Dao” too flashes before us in a startled glimpse. Therefore the “grasping the intent and forgetting the words” that Zhuangzi speaks of is by no means simply casting off speech, but is, with speech-act, arousing the human's unconscious activity, summoning behavior-language memory, in order to realize the mutual fusion of human and object-world and the illumination of the “Dao.” At this point, speech-act is no longer an independent existence, but interfuses with behavior-language and merges into the newly-constructed perfectly-fused world; the “intent” is generated precisely in this perfectly-fused world.

The Laozi places “Dao” and “virtue” (de) side by side, and lays its emphasis on “governing by non-action” and “teaching without words”; its “Dao” already simultaneously embraces the Dao of heaven and the Dao of the human, and the Dao of the human too is rooted in the Dao of heaven; therefore it says: “The content of great virtue follows from the Dao alone.” (18) This recognition of the relation of “Dao” and “virtue” accords with Confucius and Confucian thought, only that, relative to Laozi and Zhuangzi, Confucius spoke less of the abstruse and empty Dao of heaven; this accords with his notion of revering the Dao of heaven and not speaking of prodigies, force, disorder, and gods—what he attended to more was the intimate Dao of the human. On one hand, Confucius held that the “Dao,” as the supreme standard, is hard to cognize and unattainable; the so-called “hear the Dao in the morning, and one may die content in the evening” (19) precisely stresses that the “Dao” cannot be heard, cannot be reached, to the point that one would willingly exchange one's own life for the bodily realization of the “Dao.” On this, Zheng Xuan comments: “It means that one is about to die, and grieves not to have heard that there is the Dao in the world.” (20) On the other hand, in Confucius and Confucian thought, the “Dao” also exists within the human himself, manifested in human behavior and discourse—this is the physical “habit” and “principle,” within which is everywhere embodied the metaphysical “Dao”; therefore it is said: “The gentleman works at the root; when the root is established, the Dao is born.” (21) The “Dao” in the heart is “benevolence,” that is, the inner standard of the mind; in behavior it is “ritual,” that is, the outer behavioral norm; “music” concurrently holds both, both inwardly cultivating mind-and-will and outwardly forming behavior—yet both take the “Dao” as their root, so the Analects, “Shu Er,” says: “Set the will on the Dao, hold fast to virtue, lean on benevolence, and roam in the arts.” (22) So long as the human practices from the daily behavioral cultivation, and roams at ease among the six arts, with a single thread running through, he naturally draws near the “Dao”—this is “when the root is established, the Dao is born.” (23)

If Laozi and Zhuangzi incline more toward thinking the abstruse and ever-abstruse “Dao” from the metaphysical angle, and at the same time, in order to “embody the Dao” and “apprehend the Dao,” advocate abolishing all behavior and the desire for knowledge that runs counter to the natural, washing away the abstruse vision and “departing from form and casting off knowledge” through “mind-fasting” and “sitting in forgetfulness” to awaken the human's unconscious intuition and directly apprehend the natural “Dao”—within which is revealed the notable characteristics and important action of behavior-language—then Confucius and the Confucians tend to directly attend to human behavior, attempting to draw near the “Dao” through concrete behavior. This in fact stresses regarding human behavior as a sign-system possessing social significance and a hierarchy of value, that is, behavior-language, and norming behavior-language with “ritual,” thereby establishing social order, while at the same time taking the Dao of heaven as the legitimacy-basis of the Dao of the human. Therefore, attending to behavior-language, and grasping the world's origin and supreme law from the angle of behavior-language—viewed from this line of thought, Laozi-Zhuangzi-Daoists and Confucius-Confucians again, by different roads, arrive at the same destination; the two have no fundamental difference.

The above two different recognitions of the world's origin and supreme law fully display the difference of the integral structure of Chinese and Western peoples' symbolic-sign activity. In Han-Chinese culture, behavior-language has a more foundational position; this characteristic is vividly manifested in the recognition of the “Dao” and in the choice of the path of “embodying the Dao,” manifested in the high esteem for the social significance of behavior-language. As for the “unity of heaven and human” that Confucians and Daoists commonly esteem, it can only be built on the functional characteristics of behavior-language. It is precisely behavior-language that relates and fuses human with world, constructing a mutually-pervading unified whole. Comparatively, Western peoples lean more toward speech-act, and thereby lead to a stress on the dualistically-split cognitive path; and their attitude toward the “idea” cannot but produce a contradiction: when Plato relates the “idea” to the linguistic concept, it can then only be cognized through intellect, and he stresses its rational character; but the relation of human and world is, after all, jointly constructed by the two acts (languages), and is first of all founded on behavior-language; so Plato, as if vaguely apprehending that the “idea” is not only related to the linguistic concept but is something transcending the concept, then cannot but seek the help of “divine madness.” This in essence attempts, through divine madness, to summon the unconscious, by the help of behavior-language to reconnect afresh the seamless fusion of human and world, to recollect the original chaotic experience, and thereby to reach through to the ontic world. Yet, in Plato's thought, divine madness is only an auxiliary remedy he had to adopt; his dominant thought is still to stress language and reason—and this is precisely what Western language-centrism makes inevitable.

Since the world's origin and supreme law are the “idea” or the “Dao,” and the myriad things in this or that way partake of the “idea” or embody the “Dao,” then human cultural production necessarily accords with the mode of grasping the “idea” or the “Dao.” For Western peoples, all cultural activity is an attempt to partake of the imitation-process of the “idea,” either becoming the shadow of the idea, or becoming the shadow of a shadow. And Han-Chinese cultural activity all along revolves around hearing the Dao, embodying the Dao, tracing the Dao to its source, apprehending the Dao, knowing the Dao, attaining the Dao, dwelling at ease in the Dao, illuminating the Dao, carrying the Dao, and delighting in the Dao; the “Dao” is both the starting point and basis of Han-Chinese cultural activity, the law that must be followed, and the ultimate goal and destination. The understanding of “idea” and “Dao” can most typically reflect the different modes of relating between Chinese and Western peoples and the world; therefore, the difference of the mode of grasping and the concrete understanding of “idea” and “Dao” also regulates the difference of Chinese and Western culture. To put it further: it is precisely the difference of the integral structure of symbolic-sign activity—that is, the difference of the mode of combination and inclination of speech-act and behavior-language—that determines the difference of the mode of grasping and understanding “idea” and “Dao,” and determines the difference of the cultural activity of different peoples.

Human symbolic-sign activity has an inner coherence and unity; it runs through all human activity, and especially through cultural activity, and endows the culture of each people with a unique individuality.

III. The Characteristics of Literary Theory and the Structural Characteristics of the Symbolic-Sign System

Although literature is the art of language, its characteristics cannot but first of all depend on the integral structure and inclination of the mutual relatedness of speech-act and behavior-language. Western peoples stress the split world made by speech-act; from the start they throw the human into the dualistically-opposed relation with nature; the world becomes the human's object-world, a world filled with riddle, conflict, and peril, and from this is promoted the development of epic, tragedy, and narrative literature. The Han people's kindred relation with behavior-language makes them naturally fuse with nature (heaven), and from this gain poetic existence. Among the Han people, not only does poetry become the source of literature, attaining an incomparable flourishing and long becoming the dominant type of literature, but, because the Han language always closely relates to behavior-language, it cannot but especially value the meaning beyond words and the import beyond the text, stressing implicitness and indirection, even regarding “only seeing the disposition-and-feeling, not seeing the words” as the “utmost of the Dao.” (24) This in essence stresses that behavior-language is indispensable, stresses that speech-act arouses the potential of behavior-language memory. As for the “bi and xing” that poetry values, they are directly built on the foundation of behavior-language. “Bi and xing” are the flowers of wisdom that behavior-language confers, blooming from the unity of human and world and the resonance of feeling with external things. In fact, ancient Chinese poetry, characterized by the creation of the “image” that unifies subject and object, is clearly distinct from the “lyric poetry” that Western peoples build on the foundation of the subject-object split.

The characteristics of literary theory depend not only on the characteristics of literature itself, but are also importantly influenced by the cultural environment and thinking habits. Or one may put it further: in Chinese and Western symbolic-sign activity, the integral structure and inclination of the mutual relatedness of behavior-language and speech-act determine the difference of Chinese and Western literary theory, and are most fully embodied in literary-theoretical categories and discourse-forms.

The structural characteristics and inclination of Western peoples' symbolic-sign activity determine that Western literary theory cannot break free of the influence of Plato and Aristotle. (25) Plato's distinction of the three worlds of idea, reality, and literature-art, and his notion of communicating the three worlds through “imitation,” determine the basic direction of the whole of Western literary theory. In Western literary theory, “imitation” long has an irreplaceable important position; tragedy and comedy depend precisely on what is imitated and how it is imitated, and this notion takes precisely the objective relation of human split from world as its premise, built on the foundation of speech-act's distinguishing function. Other [dualisms]—such as matter and form, content and form, truth and language, essence and appearance, story and plot, story and narration—are likewise inferred from what is imitated, with what it is imitated, and how it is imitated; all manner of dualistic-opposed thought-methods take the stress on speech-act as their basis, and go on to regard the world, the myriad things, and literature-art as “object.” As for satire, humor, metaphor, symbol, and irony, these categories directly involve the mode and strategy of linguistic expression. Formalist literary theory, structuralist poetics, and narratology are built precisely on the foundation of the linguistic turn, and from this Western literary theory almost completely focuses its eye on language. In the form of style, although Plato adopted a dialogue-style rich in dramatic and poetic quality, his mode of discourse is rigorous deductive inference and logical analysis. This mode of thinking became the basic characteristic of Western literary theory; the various literary-theoretical categories and sub-categories are precisely constructed into a literary-theoretical system within logical relations, by classification.

Plato's doctrine of “divine madness” was later deduced into another auxiliary side-line of literary theory: from speaking through madness, to the Romantic genius's creation and inspiration, all the way to life-philosophy, intuitionism, phenomenology, ontology, modern hermeneutics, and reception theory, and thereby formed the divergence of humanism and scientism, using this to correct scientism's bias of ignoring the phenomenon of life and screening existence, attempting to let the original experience manifest itself. This in essence has already touched on the uniqueness of behavior-language. Although it appears in a critical guise, it can only be in a marginal position, and finally still pools into the problem of linguistic interpretation.

For the Han people, the recognition of the “Dao” all along influences the development of literary theory and determines the uniqueness of ancient Chinese literary theory. In An Analysis of the Meta-Categories of Ancient Chinese Literary Theory, Yang Xingying takes “qi,” “image” (xiang), and “savor” (wei) as the meta-categories of ancient Chinese literary theory, (26) pointing out that the other literary-theoretical categories are all derived from these few meta-categories, and places “qi” first. In fact, among the categories of ancient Chinese thought, “qi” is close to and connected with “Dao”; “qi” takes “Dao” as its root, as in “qi is that which, being empty, awaits things. The Dao alone gathers in emptiness; emptiness is the mind-fasting.” (27) But the two also have a subtle difference: “Yin and yang are qi. Qi is the physical (below-form); the Dao is the metaphysical (above-form). The metaphysical is the recondite.” (28) Relative to the metaphysical “Dao,” the physical “qi” more concretely exists in the human and the myriad things; it is the root of life, not abstruse and unfathomable like the “Dao,” relatively more easily apprehended and spoken by people—this is precisely the reason ancient Chinese literary theory takes “qi” as a meta-category.

Just as “Dao” is a non-objective existence, “qi” likewise pervades and fuses the life of the human and the myriad things; it both governs the human's talent-nature and temperament and is manifested as the stylistic characteristics of the text. Therefore, when the individuality of people of the Wei-Jin period began to awaken, “qi” extended from the appraisal of human character to literary evaluation as a matter of course, smoothly as water to a channel. Cao Pi's “Discourse on Literature” in the Authoritative Discourses says: “In literature, qi is the master; the clarity or turbidity of qi has its substance, and cannot be attained by force. To compare it to music: though the melody is even and the rhythm conforms to the measure, yet because the drawing-out of the qi is uneven, the skill and clumsiness have their lot; though it be between father and son, the one cannot transfer it to the other.” (29) To evaluate literary style from the angle of human individuality—its basis lies precisely in the qi of the text, that is, the qi of the human; not only does the human unify with heaven and unify with things, but it also unifies with the text, and hidden behind it is precisely the function-action exerted by behavior-language. Individual temperament is chiefly shaped by behavior-language; whether behavioral characteristics or psychological characteristics, they are all built on the foundation of behavior-language. Behavior-language not only pervades human and nature, but at the same time pervades the institutions and texts; to grasp behavior-language is to grasp the ceaselessly-generating, ever-flowing-and-changing “qi,” to grasp the essential quality of the text.

Yang Xingying makes a meticulous statistical analysis of the category of “qi” in The Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons, and on this basis draws the conclusion: “From phonetic-qi, blood-qi, and bodily-qi to intentional-qi, upright-qi, and qi-measure; from heavenly-qi and qi-image to talent-qi, qi-momentum, and qi-nature; from essential-qi and primal-qi to qi-rhythm, diction-qi, and atmospheric-qi, the use of ‘qi’ in The Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons covers everything from the physiological to the psychological, from natural climate to the human's temperament and talent-nature, from the life-root embodied in the creating subject's body all the way to the vitality, qi-momentum, qi-rhythm, and stylistic features manifested in the created object. The ‘qi’ in The Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons displays a multitude of connotations, fully embodying the inclusiveness, extensibility, fusedness, and blurredness of the connotation and extension of the category of ‘qi.’” (30) Not only “qi”—the great majority of categories in ancient literary theory, such as spirit-rhythm (shenyun), feeling-and-will, wind-bone (fenggu), nature-and-spirit, image (yixiang), and savor (ziwei), have connotations and extensions all possessing inclusiveness, fusedness, and blurredness; and these characteristics are precisely the functional characteristics of behavior-language, which often can be apprehended only according to the concrete context, and cannot, like Western literary theory, use language to make relatively clear definitions and explanations of the various categories.

The category “image” (xiang) in ancient Chinese literary theory is likewise so; it refers more to “image” (yixiang), “stirring-image” (xingxiang), and “realm-image” (jingxiang), likewise possessing subjectivity and indeterminacy; it is a state of subject-object fusion, ever-moving and unfixed, fleeting in an instant, and moreover it often stresses “the image beyond the image” or “the realm beyond the realm.” Compared with the relatively close categories of “object,” “phenomenon,” and “figure” in Western literary theory, because “image” lacks objective determinacy, it not only cannot be subjected to logical analysis but also cannot be placed before the brows of the eyes—it is the flower in the mirror, the moon in the water. In ancient Chinese literary theory, even the category “form” (xing), which has a certain objectivity, is chiefly for the sake of conveying the “spirit” (shen), pursuing “spirit-likeness” rather than “form-likeness,” even to the point of “departing from form and attaining likeness.” This is clearly different from Western literary theory's stress on the concreteness and definiteness of “figure” itself, its stress that content can only be conveyed through “figure” and “form.” And “spirit” is precisely the abstruse, subjective, and indeterminate category, which needs to be grasped through intuition and apprehension, through behavior-language.

Closely related to “image” is the formless “great image” or “image-less” (xiangwang). The Zhuangzi, “Heaven and Earth,” says: “The Yellow Emperor wandered north of the Red Water, ascended the heights of Mount Kunlun, and gazed southward. On returning, he lost his dark pearl. He sent Knowledge to seek it but could not get it; he sent Li Zhu (sharp sight) to seek it but could not get it; he sent Wrangling Debate to seek it but could not get it. Then he sent Image-less, and Image-less got it. The Yellow Emperor said: ‘Strange! That it should be Image-less who could get it!’” (31) The vague and indistinct “Dao” is what the human's intellect, sense-organs, or language cannot capture, and can only be reached by the help of “Image-less.” “Image-less” is precisely the image of the formless, that is, the “great image.” When people no longer regard “image” as “object,” but, by the help of imagination, unite with “image,” “image” then turns into “non-object,” becomes the “great image” or “Image-less.” It is both “being,” yet, because the sense-organs have nowhere to apply themselves to it, it is also “nothing”—that is, it is the human's unconscious intuition, the non-objective relation established through behavior-language. The “great image” and “Image-less” are in effect the non-objective state turned from “image.” This thing-and-self-as-one relation is precisely the path of “embodying the Dao” and “apprehending the Dao,” and therefore “Image-less” itself already implicitly contains the “Dao” of “moving in a circle and never ceasing.” As for the “image” (yixiang), “conception-realm” (yijing), and “realm” (jingjie) derived from “image,” they the more clearly stress subject-object fusion, stressing the fusion of human and thing, of feeling and scene—just as Wang Fuzhi says: “Feeling and scene are named as two, yet in fact cannot be separated. The divine in poetry is the marvelous fusion that leaves no trace. The skilled have feeling within the scene, and scene within the feeling.” (32)

Language cannot capture the “Dao”; the “Dao” that language speaks has already fallen into the spoken “object”—it is by no means the “constant Dao”; the “Dao” is distorted and screened in language. “Image” (xiang), however, is different from language; it is not conceptual or determinate; it can turn into “Image-less,” and therefore can “set up the image to fully express the intent,” by the help of “Image-less” to seek the “Dao.” This makes it so that Chinese literature, which values “Dao” and “qi” and takes them as purpose and basis, cannot but especially value “image,” and “image” is likewise doomed to become a literary-theoretical category, and thereby endows ancient Chinese literary theory with a unique characteristic.

As for the category “savor” (wei), it must be realized directly through the human's bodily behavior. “Savor” dissolves the distance between body and object; it is manifested in the process of the human fusing with the object. The “relishing-savor,” “lingering-savor,” and “tasting-savor” in ancient literary theory are all derived from “savor,” and this the more is poles apart from Western literary theory's stress on aesthetic distance.

The peculiarity of the literary-theoretical categories lies, in the last analysis, in the fact that ancient Chinese literary theory does not simply view literary problems from the angle of speech-act, but inadvertently touches behavior-language. This is to say, in the symbolic-sign activity of the Han people, behavior-language exerts an important structural action. The functional characteristics of behavior-language shape the relational model of human and world, and lay the foundation for the unity of heaven and human; it determines the cultural characteristics of the Han people, determines the characteristics of literature and literary theory.

In Chinese Poetics, Ye Weilian takes the palindromic poem in ancient Chinese poetry as an example, and makes a deep exposition of the “transmission-interpretation activity” of classical Chinese poetry. He points out that the palindromic poem can enter the poem from any starting point, any angle, and any direction; this characteristic the literature of Indo-European languages can hardly accomplish. The language of Indo-European languages lacks the liveliness that classical Chinese possesses; it is constrained by complex grammatical components. What the palindromic poem embodies is, to be sure, the limit of the liveliness of classical Chinese, but “this liveliness lets a free relation be established between the character and the reader; the reader keeps a ‘both-near-and-far’ interpretive activity among the characters, and in the middle zone between ‘signifying’ and ‘not-signifying,’ creates a state resembling the ‘pre-signifying’ self-presentation of the object. We, before this poem, those characters, are as it were some objects in an open space; because no meaning and relation are preset, we can freely enter and exit among them, can enter from different angles, and each entry can gain a different level of aesthetic feeling.” (33) In the “transmission-interpretation activity” of classical Chinese poetry, the spatial relation between reader and poem is indeterminate, even the “host-position” is absent, the temporal-position too is undivided, and there is a partiality for “performability” and “foresensing-and-aftersensing.” All such things are in fact rooted in the functional characteristics of behavior-language, that is, what Ye Weilian called “the state of the pre-signifying self-presentation of the object.” On this basis, Ye Weilian points out: “This mode of conveying-meaning in classical Chinese poetry is the richest, so that we have such sayings as ‘only intuitively grasped, not transmittable in words,’ ‘the intent beyond the words,’ ‘the words do not exhaust the intent.’ And the character ‘intent’ (yi), in the world of Chinese criticism, is spoken of in this way and that, with still no fixed conclusion; but we hold that there should be no fixed conclusion, and especially that one should not, like some commentators, directly explain ‘intent’ (yi) as ‘meaning’ (yi), directly as ‘a certain character represents a certain meaning’; such a single view is the legacy of logical thinking… the so-called ‘intent’ in fact contains a multitude of suggestive thought-threads; perhaps we may, with reference to the usage of ‘sorrow-thread’ and ‘thought-thread,’ extend it as ‘intent-thread’—all referring to the feeling-situation and state that is sensible but inexhaustible in words.” (34) Ye Weilian extremely keenly realizes that the “intent” (yi) of poetry differs from “meaning” (yi), differs from “a certain character represents a certain meaning.” In fact, the “intent” of poetry lodges precisely in the tension-field jointly constructed by speech-act and behavior-language; it draws us to throw ourselves into it, to immerse and savor, to experience with behavior-language the vague feeling-situation that is “sensible but inexhaustible in words.” Behavior-language and speech-act can both communicate and transform, yet cannot exhaustively communicate. It is precisely this non-exhaustive-communicability that makes classical Chinese poetry unable but to pursue implicit accumulation, unable but to pursue the meaning beyond words and the import beyond the rhyme, striving to endow speech-act with an inner tension, in order, with limited speech-act, to entice, to dot-and-awaken, to trigger the infinite, unfixed, unfinished behavior-language—so that “the meaning is born beyond the text, the secret echo communicates roundabout, the latent ornament springs forth” (35)—making diction become a kind of conversation that goes in and out of historical space, becoming “one more window in the vast time-space of the secret echoes communicating roundabout,” (36) and literary theory becomes the effective path of reaching through the window and jointly joining the conversation.

The above poetic and humanistic characteristics are likewise manifested in the discourse-form of ancient literary theory. In A Study of the Poetic Characteristics of Ancient Chinese Literary Theory, Li Jianzhong traces back to “the origin of the humanities” to expound the poetic wisdom of the Han people. He holds that Chinese and Western literary theory have a common source of poetic wisdom, but Western literary theory took the road of philosophization and logicization, while Chinese literary theory preserved the unity of logicality and poeticity, preserving poetic utterance. The poetic metaphor of “drawing analogies and linking categories” and “concrete bi and xing” is an important discourse-mode of Chinese literary theory; using poetry to speak of poetry, with poetry, text, and commentary mutually pervading, is an important stylistic form of Chinese literary theory; the stress on “marvelous apprehension,” “direct seeking,” and “tasting-savor” is an important experiential mode of understanding poetry and text; and poetic utterance is moreover often “personified”—the human's bodily structure, spiritual temperament, and developmental change all enter the metaphorical system of literary theory, pervading and running through the whole beginning and end of ancient literary theory. The commentator is also the poet; the commentary is also poetic language. It is precisely through this peculiar mode and path that ancient Chinese literary theory can make a poetic depiction of the characteristics and functions of the integral, poetic poetic-thinking of ancient China. As for the root of the peculiarity of the discourse of literary theory, Li Jianzhong points out: “Fundamentally, the creation of the human's text (wen) is precisely, on the basis of the perceptible myriad things of heaven and earth, the construction of the imperceptible ontic Great Ultimate or Dao, and, on this premise, with one's own peculiar literary grace and writing, the speaking-out and expounding of this Great Ultimate or Dao. This is the essence of Chinese poetic culture, and thereby also the essence of Chinese poetic literary theory.” (37) And all this is again inseparable from the integral structure of symbolic-sign activity, inseparable from the dominant action that behavior-language exerts therein.

The difference between Chinese and Western literary theory is rooted precisely in the difference of symbolic-sign activity, rooted in the difference of the integral structure and inclination of speech-act and behavior-language; only by grasping this key can we deeply explain the national peculiarity of culture, thinking, literature, and literary theory, and grasp the possibility of their mutual communication and fusion.

IV. The Mechanism and Path of the Reconstruction of Literary Theory

In the course of the modern transformation of Chinese society, with the growth of the urban-citizen class, the development of the newspaper-and-publishing industry, the formation of the modern education system and the discipline of literature, the awakening of the individual under modern enlightenment, the attention to public social events, and the deepening of Chinese-Western literary exchange, many factors jointly promoted a great change in Chinese literature: the authoritative position of poetry inevitably declined, while narrative literature such as fiction and drama (2) moved toward flourishing and gradually replaced the hegemonic position of poetry—this is a process of literature transforming from the “aristocratic” to the “citizen,” from “nature-and-spirit” to “society,” and is also the process of the subject's awakening causing the rupture of human and world. Even modern poetry changed the face of classical poetry. Modern poetry not only abolished the classical-Chinese diction and rhyme of classical poetry but also gave vent to a subjective feeling sharply opposed to social reality; it began to transform into another, Western-style “lyric poetry.”

When narrative literature became the chief form of literature, when the “events” and “persons” that literature narrates became “objects,” and moreover were intimately bound up with “social” and “life” problems, the dominant relation between literature and reader could not but undergo a change. Especially for the new generation of professionalized literary researchers and critics born with the discipline of literature, this is a brand-new relation: it is chiefly the relation of researcher and research-object, an objective rational-cognitive relation, and not merely an undivided life-experiential relation. Literature too is no longer merely a poetic space available for people to immerse in and fill with disposition-and-feeling, no longer merely a mode of existence; it really and solidly becomes a sharp weapon for reflecting society, critiquing society, and enlightening the mind. Even literary language becomes an “object” available for research and analysis. The change of relation greatly devalued the action of behavior-language, and the Han language's original poetic and humanistic characteristics were thereby screened, ignored, and dissolved. It is precisely in this objective cognitive relation that Western literary theory has an incomparable advantage—this is the chief reason Chinese literary theory underwent a rupture and “total Westernization.”

Differing from this temporal rupture of Chinese literary theory, within Western literary theory there has all along existed the mutual complementarity and gaming of scientism and humanism; yet scientific thinking has all along occupied the dominant position.

But the problem lies in: even narrative literature, or Western narrative literature all the way to metafiction, is still the fusion of two acts (languages), namely speech-act and behavior-language. As Louis O. Mink says, “the characteristic of narrative is to transform art into life”; (38) precisely in this process of transformation, the human's speech-act memory and behavior-language memory are fully aroused, deeply fused in imagination, and “life” again vividly floats up. The unfolding process of literature is precisely the process of the full cooperation and construction of the tension-field of the two acts (languages). This is a tension-field in which the two forces continually game; the writer and the reader exist precisely between speech-act and behavior-language, swinging between speech-act and behavior-language, shuttling between cognition and experience, reason and sense, consciousness and the unconscious, always in a marginal transitional state. The difference of literature and literary theory among different peoples that we speak of refers chiefly to the difference of the dominant inclination of the integral structure of the two acts (languages); it is the difference of the inclination that is mutually-this-mutually-that within the whole. The literature of the same people in different periods—this integral structure too will undergo variation, and generate different literary and literary-theoretical currents and schools; in the creation and reading process of the same work, because of the difference of individual habit and attitude, and the change of the same person's mentality and aim, this integral structure too will undergo corresponding change. Therefore, the integral structure of symbolic-sign activity constructed by the two acts (languages) is by no means a rigidly-fixed structure, but a flowing, changing structure. On one hand, the dominant structure determines the overall face of culture, literature, and literary theory; on the other hand, the variability of the integral structure provides, in turn, the possibility for the cultural, literary, and literary-theoretical exchange and fusion among different peoples.

In the above exposition, we see not only the root that constitutes the difference between Chinese and Western literary theory, but at the same time discover the inner mechanism of their mutual communication: the mutual fusion of the two acts (languages), namely behavior-language and speech-act. On this basis, we can go on to sketch the path of literary-theoretical construction:

First, the so-called “modern transformation of ancient literary theory” is not scientific. We can only, according to the reality of literary activity, proceed from the state of the mutual fusion and coordinated construction of the two acts (languages), and from the characteristics of speech-act and behavior-language, taking into account the reasonable factors in Chinese and Western literary theory. Relative to Western literary theory, ancient Chinese literary theory attends to the complexity and humanity of literary activity, both affirming the importance of speech and attending to the limitation of speech; therefore, the construction of a new literary theory needs to fully absorb the spiritual essence of ancient Chinese literary theory—not merely treating literature as a “cognitive object” to view and speak of, still less merely equating literature with language or speech to analyze, but first of all attending to the experiential process of literary activity itself; not pursuing definition and system-building under the various literary-theoretical categories, but doing its utmost to maintain the elasticity of the categories themselves and the tension among the various categories, proceeding from the reality of literary activity, selecting the relevant categories in Chinese and Western literary theory and re-smelting them anew.

Second, literary research must take creation-experience and reading-experience as its foundation. Only in creation and reading do speech-act and behavior-language fully unfold; only then do we truly have a common ground with literature, truly deal with literature. This, ancient Chinese literati noticed long ago. For ancient literary theory, the commentator is the poet, and the commentary is poetic language; what they most stress is the chanting of poetry-and-text; poetry-and-text is only a by-product derived from this, the natural apprehension of writers and readers immersing in it; and reading-experience is precisely the holistic grasp of literary experience—it can only draw near the true essence through concrete literary works, through reading and apprehension. From this angle, ancient Chinese literary theory is precisely equivalent to literary interpretation and evaluation; it has theoretical character, yet avoids using the theoretical form; that earlier-generation scholars called it “literary criticism” precisely grasps the essence.

Although research done on the literary text often attends only to speech-act and thereby omits behavior-language, so that the literary characteristic too is thereby lost, it has its corresponding theoretical form and theoretical character; for our further deep understanding of literature and the work it still has value, only that the scope of application and effectiveness of such research must be limited. We should regard such research results as a kind of “tool” of literary research, serving literary research, and not replacing literary research. That earlier-generation scholars, according to the theoretical form, called it “literary theory” has its rationality.

Third, the construction of literature and the work is simultaneously the coordinated unfolding of speech-act and behavior-language; this is both constrained by the characteristics of discourse and constrained by the characteristics of the receiver; it is the coordinated cooperation of both sides. But language, as a most basic institutional fact, has its normativity already received by people and stamped on the human's mind; therefore, between the textual discourse and the receiver, discourse has a natural priority—it, wittingly or unwittingly, dominates or influences the receiver's mode and attitude of reception. J. Hillis Miller, in turn, uses the “ethics of reading” to explain the reader's response to the text. He says: “Within the act of reading there exists an ethical moment… Reading is a response to a certain object; reading acknowledges it, responds to it, respects it.” (39) It is precisely in this sense that Formalist literary theory, structuralist poetics, narratology, and postmodern narratology have important value. The analysis and exposition these Western literary theories make of the textual structure and discourse-characteristics provides precisely an effective means for us to grasp the concrete state of literary activity, to grasp the mode in which speech-act and behavior-language mutually act and the change of the tension-field they construct, and how the receiver goes back and forth, in the end, within this tension-field. Jakobson points out: for the reader of poetry, “so long as he understands the form of the poem, he will unwittingly gain the hint of language's ‘hierarchical order.’” (40) We can regard all kinds of different narrative strategies, discourse-forms, and stylistic features as means to modulate the receiver's attitude of reception, to modulate the mutual relation between text and receiver, to modulate the integral structure of speech-act and behavior-language, and thereby explore and depict the construction of the literary work. The reader, in turn, cannot ignore the modulation of the text, discourse, and strategy; they cannot but make their own response and compromise, and the interpretation thus formed, though plural, is again communicable and explorable. As for literary rhetoric, modern hermeneutics, reception aesthetics, and reading theory, because they themselves have already unified the various factors of author, reader, text, discourse, and linguistic context into one theoretical horizon to examine their mutual action, they too have a certain degree of mutual harmony with ancient Chinese literary theory, only that they must be re-examined, corrected, and deepened on a new theoretical premise. It is precisely here that we discover the growth-point of cultural studies, gender studies, postcolonialism, feminism, postmodern narratology, and cultural poetics, and see how the various peoples', political, economic, and cultural powers, after all, act upon literature through the construction of various institutional facts. However, the introduction of the various postmodern literary theories must also fix its eye on the speech-act and behavior-language in literary activity, must especially value the tension between the special individual's speech-act, behavior-language, and the various institutional facts, and from this go on to redevelop a deep exposition. This is to say, for a concrete literary work, simply to apply the various subjectivity-banishing “post-isms,” and not fully attend to the inherent tension-relation between the work's discourse, its various factors, and the institutional facts, is bound to fall into the net of mechanical determinism.

Fourth, literature is both the study of the human and the art of language. As the study of the human, its essence is precisely the study of “human behavior.” Human behavior first of all belongs to life-fact, and not to institutional fact, yet it cannot but be constrained by institutional fact. Institutional fact, whether as an external coercive force or as a habit imprinted on the body and internalized into the body, in various ways intervenes in and constrains human behavior; therefore, behavior is always the result of the human's life mutually depending on, and mutually conflicting with, the various institutional facts. The so-called character-logic that the writer's characters cannot but possess is, in essence, precisely because life has its own “logic” (that is, the normativity of life, a non-logical “logic”), while the various institutional facts have a completely different “other” logic; they mutually act, the two sides maintain a tension, and jointly shape the characters' peculiar behavior-language, governing the character-logic that the writer cannot manipulate at will. Literature, as the study of the human, cannot but involve all manner of institutional facts, and language itself is the most basic institutional fact. Whether as the language that is the carrier of literature, or as the persons and society that literature depicts, they either belong to institutional fact, or are founded on institutional fact, or are constrained by institutional fact. In the last analysis, institutional fact is precisely aimed at, and norms, the operational mode of the human's speech-act and behavior-language, and is even deeply embedded in speech-act and behavior-language; therefore, for literary research, institutional fact itself is an important object that needs to be researched.

In fact, institutional fact is by no means invented by some god or some individual, but is the result of the gaming, negotiation, and consultation of the various social groups and social forces, and changes with the social-historical context, under the common influence of historical inheritance and social fashion. It is precisely here that we discover the growth-point of cultural studies, gender studies, and postcolonialism, feminism, postmodern narratology, and cultural poetics, and see how the various peoples', political, economic, and cultural powers, after all, act upon literature through the construction of various institutional facts.

Fifth, as for the psychological analysis of the work and its characters, we can, from the structural characteristics and mutual relation of behavior-language and speech-act respectively, unfold an exploration, examining the accommodation, divergence, even confrontation and conflict between human behavior (including speech-act) and the various institutional facts, transforming the mind-problems hidden in the black-box into external, concrete, understandable, graspable behavior-language and speech-act. And the connection and distance between the writer and the work's hidden-collaborators are rooted precisely in the continuity and difference of the function of the institutional facts touched in the real situation and the virtual situation. The contradiction-problem between literature's independence and its social-historicity can also be explained thereby.

Sixth, literary rhetoric distinguishes “work” from “text”; this practice still has significance, and we can, according to it, make a distinction of “literary theory”: In fact, literature and the work can only be jointly constructed in the unfolding process of speech-act and behavior-language; all the characteristics of literature, including literariness and poeticity, are generated in this process. The essence and core of literary research is the research of the literary work and not the research of the text; it is the interpretation and evaluation of literature, a holistic grasp of literary experience; it can only draw near the true essence through concrete literary works, through reading and apprehension. From this angle, ancient Chinese literary theory is precisely equivalent to literary interpretation and evaluation; it has theoretical character, yet avoids using the theoretical form; that earlier-generation scholars called it “literary criticism” precisely grasps the essence. Although research done on the literary text often attends only to speech-act and thereby omits behavior-language, so that the literary characteristic too is thereby lost, it has its corresponding theoretical form and theoretical character; for our further deep understanding of literature and the work it still has value, only that the scope of application and effectiveness of such research must be limited. We should regard such research results as a kind of “tool” of literary research, serving literary research, and not replacing literary research. That earlier-generation scholars, according to the theoretical form, called it “literary theory” has its rationality.

Since literature is the mutual cooperation of speech-act and behavior-language, the mutual resonance of consciousness and the unconscious, the mutual pervading of spirit and body, jointly generated by both sides, then, when we attempt to capture literature's “fish” with language's “trap,” we must attend to the mode of linguistic expression, must do our utmost to maintain the inner tension by which speech-act arouses behavior-language, that is, do our utmost to use poetic language and avoid pure logical language. Otherwise, one can often capture only the fish's skeleton and the concept of the fish, and not the living, whole fish. On this point, ancient Chinese literary theory, as well as the poetic utterance of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein, all have an advantage in this respect. And text-research is different; in order to pursue the clarity of theory, it is entirely permissible to use logical language and logical analysis.

In sum, the construction of literary theory can only take Chinese and Western literary theory as its foundation, and, on this foundation, strive to attempt communication, fusion, and re-creation; and to realize this goal, one must again find the deep root of the difference between Chinese and Western literary theory, find the inner mechanism of their mutual communication. We hold that the difference between Chinese and Western literary theory is hidden precisely in the complexity and inclination of the integral structure of symbolic-sign activity, hidden in the historicity and variability of speech-act, behavior-language, and their mutual relation; only by grasping this key can we crack literature's “riddle of the Sphinx,” and only then does the construction of literary theory have a clear direction.

Speech-act and behavior-language are humankind's most basic, most original sign-systems; they jointly build the framework of human culture, shape the structure of human mind and body, and are the true root of human civilization. Starting from the structural characteristics and mutual relation of speech-act and behavior-language, we can crack the mysteries of cultural production, the mind black-box, body-habit, human civilization, and literature and literary theory. The peculiarity of the human sciences arises precisely from the uniqueness of human behavior and behavior-language, arises from the complexity of the mode of interweaving and fusion of the two acts (languages); but Western scholars often can hardly avoid language-centrism—and this is precisely the unique advantage that Chinese cultural tradition confers on us. We should, with a broader horizon, after the linguistic turn and the cultural turn, turn from the pure linguistic horizon to attending to both acts (languages) and their mutual relation, and thereby reconstruct a new theoretical framework, further advancing the development of theory.